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STATEMENT u r JUR1SD1CTK)N
 :. 
M e i r r ; i : •'* -• * ' - * .- \« *" 
Statement of Jurisdiction offered by Ste\e Smith and Catherine Smith (the "Smiths"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A . j - . M , , 
1. Should the Smith's appeal he di^ni^-.. l ] •* . : ' \ - -.> - v - - ,s-
failure ;o include a copy of the iranseripi of the summan judgment hearing in the record 
on appeal, when the district court detailed its reasons for granting Mar\ Mel's Motion for 
2. Did the district court correal} determine that because ;! . <\^:- . . . 
make a prima facie showing of negligent misrepresentation that Marc Mel wab entitled to 
hic-inent as a matter oi law? 
make a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment that Man Mel was em-*1- ; 
judgment as a matter of law? 
"* * ' *'- •- -- '
v s:.-.^. ;• ..ci_nv,.ne :;ait oecause me Smiths could not 
make a prima facie showing oi ne^i^enee thai Ma-- \ ! •; u.•••; • •*;-; ..i
 i/:,; :> a 
matter of law? 
-• •> 'die district court's judgment also supported h\ the economic loss rule? 
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B. Standard of Review 
While Mary Mel agrees that this court reviews a district court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness, Mary Mel asserts that this court cannot make an appropriate 
review of the proceedings due to the Smiths* failure to include the transcript of the 
summary judgment hearing within the record on appeal. Bevan v. J.H. Construction Co. 
Inc.. 669 P.2d 442. 443 (Utah 1983). 
In analyzing Mary MeFs assertion that the economic loss rule also precludes the 
Smiths* claims, an appellate court can affirm on any appropriate ground, even if it was 
not raised at the district court. Straub v. Fisher and PaykeI Health Care, 990 P.2d 384, 
386 (Utah 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Smiths brought this lawsuit against several parties in the chain of title of a lot 
they own in Lehi, Utah. Mary Mel was one such party. The Smiths allege several tort 
claims against Mary Mel for its alleged failure to disclose problems with the compaction 
of the lot. Mary Mel counters that its work in the subdivision containing the lot 
consisted solely of installing roads, utilities, curb, sidewalks and gutters. Mary Mel had 
no knowledge of any improperly compacted ground, and it was the obligation of the 
homeowner and the homebuilder to perform proper compaction tests on the lots before 
the home was built. 
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B. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Smiths filed a residential construction defect lawsuit against Mary Mel, 
Patterson Construction, Inc.. GT Investments and Joseph Smart on June 29, 2000. R. 12. 
After sufficient discovery had taken place between the parties, all of the defendants filed 
motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Mary MeFs motion for 
summan judgment. R. 1245-46. In making its ruling on Mary Mel's motion for 
summary judgment, the district court provided its reasons for granting such motion from 
the bench at the end of the hearing on the motion. The Smiths have not included a copy 
of this transcript in the record. On or about November, 20, 2001, the district court signed 
an order granting Mary Mel's motion for summary judgment and ordering all claims 
against it dismissed. R. 1245-46. The Smiths filed a notice of appeal on March 15, 
2002. R. 1342. 
C. MATERIAL FACTS 
In approximately 1992 to 1993 Mary Mel acquired an interest in a piece of 
property which would eventually become known as the Summercrest Subdivision in 
LehL Utah. R. 554. The lot which would the Smiths later purchased, Lot 223, (the 
"Property") was included in this property. In October of 1995 Man* Mel delivered a 
warrant}' deed to the Property to Patterson Construction, Inc. R. 373. In between the 
time Man Mel acquired any interest in the property and the time Mary Mel conveyed its 
interest to Patterson Construction, Mary Mel's involvement in the property consisted 
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solely of obtaining the necessary permits from Lehi City Planning Commission and Lehi 
City counsel to install a subdivision and installing the roads, utilities, curb, sidewalk and 
gutters. R. 552-53. Mary Mel did no other work on the property. Id. Contrary to the 
assertions of the Smiths, it was Patterson who actually developed the Summercrest 
subdivision by buying all of the approved lots from Mary Mel, selling some of the lots 
and building homes on most of the lots. R. 1070-71. 
After obtaining title from Mary Mel, Patterson construction delivered a warranty 
deed to the Property to GT Investments on October 10, 1995. R. 372. GT Investments 
built a home on the Property and sold it to the Smiths on or about August 2. 1996. when 
GT Investments delivered a warranty deed to the Smiths. R. 371. The Smiths allege that 
their home eventually began to settle. R. 10. The Smiths lack any evidence beyond 
innuendo and speculation to connect the alleged settling of the home and Mary Mel's 
alleged improper compaction of fill on the property. 
The Smiths allege that as a result of the settling of the home, the home has lost 
value and has been made less usable. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In response to Mary Mel's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court held 
a hearing to determine the merits of Mary Mel's motion. At the conclusion of this 
hearing, the district court delivered detailed reasons for granting Mary Mel's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Because the district court made an oral ruling detailing the reasons 
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for its conclusions, it was imperative that the Smiths make a transcript of this record a 
part of the record on appeal so this Court could properly understand the ruling of the 
district court. The Smiths failed to include this important transcript as part of the record. 
Because of this failure, this Court should dismiss the Smiths' appeal due to the Smiths' 
failure to include all relevant portions of the record to this court. 
The district court property dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for negligent 
misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and negligence due to the Smiths' failure to 
provide the district court with sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of each of 
those causes of action. The Smiths could not prove that any statements were ever made 
by Mary Mel concerning the compaction of the lot; they could not prove that Mary Mel 
every knew any facts concerning the fill of the lot; and they could not prove that they 
ever relied on any statement made by Mary Mel, or anyone else for that matter, 
concerning the property. 
Finally, because this court can affirm the judgment of a district court on any 
appropriate ground, this court should affirm the judgment of the district court under the 
economic loss rule. Because this case involves the transactions between persons in the 
construction industry who have the ability to contract for and away risks, and because the 
Smiths' damages are solely economic in nature, the economic loss rule dictates that the 
Smiths' remedy lies in contract rather than tort. Therefore, the Smiths' actions for 
negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and negligence are barred under the 
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economic loss rule. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE OF THE SMITH'S FAILURE TO INCLUDE A 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING WHICH THE DISTRICT 
COURT HELD ON THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANTING OF THOSE MOTIONS IS 
PRESUMED TO BE VALID. 
In response to Mary Mel's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court held 
a hearing to consider the motion. During the hearing, the District Court heard argument 
concerning both the law and the impact of certain facts on that law. This hearing was 
instrumental in the district court's grant of Mary Mel's motion for summary judgment. 
However, the Smith's have not included the transcript of this hearing in the record on 
appeal. Because of this failure the district court's decisions are presumed to be valid. 
See e.g. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) ("If appellant intends to urge on 
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding 
or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript'"); Bevan v. J.H. 
Construction Co. Inc., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983) ("In the absence of a transcript, 
we assume that the proceedings at trial were regular and proper and the judgment was 
supported by competent and sufficient evidence.'"); Prudential Capital Group Co. v. 
Mattson. 802 P.2d 104,106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same). 
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In this case, the district court ruled from the bench that the Smiths could not 
establish several elements of their causes of action against Mary Mel. In so ruling, the 
district court described in detail the grounds for its decision. The district court then 
signed an order granting Mary Mel's motion for summary judgment but not stating the 
specific grounds. In such a circumstance it is the obligation of the appellant to order a 
cop\ of the transcript of the hearing in order for this Court to conduct an appropriate 
review. Utah Rides of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2). Because the Smiths failed to 
provide this crucial part of the record, their appeal should be dismissed without further 
consideration. Marbly v. City ofSouthfield, 9 Fed. Appx. 362, 2001 WL 522417 (6th 
Cir.) ("Plaintiff failed to fulfil his obligation necessary to a determination of the merits of 
his claims on appeal. Without a transcript [of default and summary judgment hearings], 
this court cannot evaluate the propriety of the challenged district court rulings, and 
plaintiff has waived review of his claims by his failure to provide a transcript/'); 
Springer v. Becker, 949 P.2d 641, 644 (Mont. 1997) (concluding even though the court 
determined that it would address the issues on appeal, it would have been appropriate to 
dismiss a case for failure to include a transcript of a summary judgment hearing). 
However, even if this Court decides to reach the merits of the case, the judgment 
of the district court should still be upheld. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE SMITH'S HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST MARY 
MEL FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The Smiths claim that the district court erred in granting Mary Mel's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissing their claim for negligent misrepresentation. However, 
it is clear that the Smiths cannot made a prima facie showing of the elements of negligent 
misrepresentation. 
The tort of negligent misrepresentation is defined as follows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) is in a 
superior position to know material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently 
makes a false representation concerning them, (4) expecting the other part 
to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other party reasonably does so and (6) 
suffers a loss in that transaction, the representor can be held responsible.1 
Debry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) {citations omitted). It 
is difficult to understand how such a tort applies to the facts of this case. 
First and foremost, no one can dispute that Mary Mel made absolutely no 
representations to the Smiths. Mary Mel was involved in a contractual relationship with 
Patterson in October of 1995 whereby Mary Mel conveyed its interest in the property in 
question to Patterson. R. 372, 552-53. Patterson, in turn, entered into a contract with GT 
Investments whereby it conveyed the Property to GT Investments who built a home on 
1
 The definition went on to state " \ . . if the other elements of fraud are also 
present/" Debry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000. 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
{citations omitted). However, in the case of Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnel, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court 
disavowed any suggestion "that the tort is dependent on proof of fraud." 
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the Property. R. 372. Ten months after this transaction, GT Investments conveyed the 
Property with the home to the Smiths. R. 371. Therefore, there were three separate sets 
of statements made between the separate contracting parties.2 With that in mind the 
Smith's theory of negligent misrepresentation seems to rest on the idea that Mary Mel 
made misrepresentations to either Patterson or GT Investments and GT Investments, in 
turn, made those representations to the Smiths. However, the facts do not warrant such a 
theory. 
The Smiths can not actually point to any statement that Mary Mel which was in 
any way incorrect. They rest their fate on the argument that "[bjefore or after the title 
was conveyed to GT Investments, neither Patterson Construction nor Appellee ever 
disclosed to GT Investments that Lot 223 was covered with uncompacted fill, or that the 
lot had formerly been a ravine that was filled during development." Brief of Appellant, 
p. 5. The Smiths have offered no proof that Mary Mel ever made any misstatements 
concerning the condition of the property. Not only that but their brief is devoid of any 
mention of any statement ever made by Mary Mel, GT Investments or any other party 
upon which they relied that was false. The Smiths do not even make the allegation in 
2
 By making their claims against Mary Mel the Smiths are simply attempting to 
usurp causes of action that might be available to either Patterson or GT Investments and 
making them their own. If the Smiths have any cause of action it is against GT 
In\ estments. It is then GT Investments or Patterson that might have a claim against Mary 
Mel. The Smiths cannot leap over GT Investments to get to Man* Mel. They must 
pursue GT Investments and allow GT Investments to make any claims against other 
parties as it deems necessary. 
10 
their brief that GT Investments told them anything about the condition of the property or 
the compaction (of lack there of) of the soils. It is axiomatic that you cannot have a 
negligent misrepresentation claim without a misrepresentation. For this reason, the 
Smiths' fail to make a prima facie case of negligent misrepresentation. 
Second, and just as fatal to the Smiths' case is that they show no reliance 
whatsoever on any statement made by Mary Mel. The facts presented to this Court are 
devoid of any reference whatsoever as to the reliance issue. Even if the court were to 
accept the Smiths' assertion that Mary Mel somehow misrepresented the compaction of 
the property to GT Investments, there exists no link between this alleged 
misrepresentation and the Smiths' behavior. Since the Smiths have presented this court 
with no proof of reliance on any specific statement of Mary Mel. the Smiths' claim fails. 
Similarly, the Smiths cannot prove that Mary Mel either had a pecuniar}7 interest 
in the transaction with the Smiths or that Mary Mel had superior knowledge of the 
compaction. The Smiths have never expressed the pecuniary interest Mary Mel had in 
any transaction with the Smiths which would satisfy their required element of proof. As 
stated numerous times Mary Mel had no interaction whatsoever with the Smiths, 
accordingly, they could have no pecuniary interest in a nonexistent transaction. 
Moreover. Mary Mel was not in a superior position to know any facts regarding 
the construction of the Smiths' home. Any and all facts which did exist or which were in 
existence at the time the Property was sold to the Smiths and were known by Mary Mel 
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were disclosed by Mary Mel to Patterson Construction prior to the sale of the Property to 
Patterson Construction. Mary Mel was not involved in the construction of the home. 
Man' Mel has no knowledge if compaction tests were ever performed prior to the 
foundation of the home being poured. All of Mary Mel's knowledge concerning the 
property is related to the road, sidewalk, curb and gutter in the subdivision. R. 552-53. 
Man' Mel was not involved in any other aspect of the work. As such it is clear that Mary 
Mel had no superior knowledge of the condition of the property when it was sold to the 
Smiths. 
The Smiths' cite several cases for the proposition that "privity in contract is 
irrelevant to a claim of negligent misrepresentation. However, in making this argument 
the Smiths fail to understand the true nature of the arguments of Mary Mel. In its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, Mary Mel admitted that 
the cases cited by the Smiths "hold that despite privity, an entity negligently making a 
false statement may be held liable."3 R. 1088. However, in the cases cited by the Smiths, 
the non-privity party directly participated in the sale of the subject property with the 
purchaser. The non-privity parties made statements directly to the purchasers, thereby 
J
 With this reference it is clear that the district court did not base its decision on 
lack of privity alone. The district court based its decision on the fact that the Smiths 
could not establish a prima facie case of any of their causes of action. This fact 
demonstrates why it was imperative that the Smiths included the transcript of the 
summary judgment hearing in the appellate record. Because it was not included this 
Court cannot appropriately determine the basis of the district court's opinion 
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making reliance the primary issue in those cases. For example, in Christenson v. 
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance, 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983), the non-privity party 
was a real estate agent who told the injured party that the subject property was comprises 
of 22.75 acres when it only contained 6.9 acres. Thus, these courts hold that a party who 
has no privity make makes a negligent misrepresentation to the injured party and that 
party relies upon that statement to his detriment that third party may be held liable.. 
How ever, the Smiths have failed to show that they relied upon any negligent 
misrepresentation made by Mary Mel. Consequently, the Smiths' constant talk of privity 
misses the point. Maty Mel's position has never been that the claims were automatically 
barred because of lack of privity, Mary Mel's position has been because there was no 
direct communication relied upon by the Smiths made by Mary Mel, the Smiths' claim 
must fail. 
For the reasons stated above this Court should affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Mary Mel on the Smiths' claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE SMITH'S HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST MARY 
MEL FOR FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
The Smiths also appeal the district court's decision dismissing their claim against 
Man* Mel for fraudulent concealment. However, as with their negligent 
misrepresentation claim, the Smiths cannot prove a prima facie case of fraudulent 
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concealment. This court has defined fraudulent concealment as follows: 
One party to a transaction who by concealment or other action intentionally 
prevent the other from acquiring material information is subject to the same 
liability to the other for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the 
nonexistence of the matter that the other was thus prevented from 
discovering. 
Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah 1994) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 550). In the instant case, there was no legal duty. 
obligation, or relationship between the Smiths and Mary Mel to support a fraudulent 
concealment claim. 
Again it is undisputed that Mary Mel did not, at any time, communicate with the 
Smiths. Accordingly, it is impossible that Mary Mel ever concealed any information 
from the Smiths. Mary Mel was never a "party to the transaction*' between GT 
Investments and the Smiths in which the Smiths acquired the Property. Importantly, 
even if Mary Mel was determined to have been a remote party to the transaction, any and 
all work performed by Mary Mel and material information related thereto, which 
included installation of the road, utilities under the road, curb, gutter, and sidewalk up to 
each individual lot was disclosed by Mary Mel to Patterson Construction. Additionally, 
the Mary Mel was not aware of any backfill compaction complained of by the Smiths. 
Further, the Smiths' wholly fail to offer any proof of the intent and knowledge 
requirements of the tort. Specifically, the Smiths fail to offer anything beyond 
speculation and innuendo that Mary Mel had any knowledge whatsoever of the fill 
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material underneath the Smiths' home. With that being said, even their innuendo fails to 
support their claim. The Smiths' expert in this case testified that he found pieces of 
construction debris, grass, sod, rebar, plastic, metal pipe and concrete in the fill material 
beneath the Smiths' home.4 R. 1049-50, 1055. Mary Mel does not use wood and other 
construction material to install utilities and roads. The inescapable conclusion of this 
fact is that Mary Mel had nothing to do with the fill. As such there is no proof 
whatsoever that Mary Mel had knowledge of the fill. 
Furthermore, the Smiths have offered no evidence whatsoever concerning the 
intent element of the cause of action. Specifically, the Smiths must make a prima facie 
showing that Mary Mel intentionally refused to disclose information concerning the fill. 
The record is devoid of any such evidence. If the Smiths cannot prove intent to conceal, 
their claim necessarily fails. 
For the reasons stated above this Court should affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Mary Mel on the Smiths' claim for fraudulent 
concealment. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE SMITH'S HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST MARY 
MEL FOR NEGLIGENCE 
Finally, the Smiths argue that the district court incorrectly dismissed their claim 
4
 Additionally, it is important to note that this same expert hired by the Smiths' 
stated that the homebuilder was the party who had an obligation to ensure that the 
property was properly compacted. 
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for negligence. The elements of negligence are well-known. "To prove negligence, a 
plaintiff must show four things: duty, breach of duty, causation and damages." Gerbich 
v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37, ^ 14, 977 P.2d 1205. 
In their complaint, the Smiths pled that Mary Mel was responsible for grading and 
earthwork on the property. This is not true. Mary Mel had no responsibility concerning 
the grading or earthwork on the property. Mary Mel's involvement consisted solely of 
obtaining the necessary permits from Lehi City Planning Commission and Lehi City 
Counsel, and installing the road, utilities, sidewalks, curb and gutter in the Summercrest 
Subdivision. R. 552-53. Thus, Mary Mel's duty to the Smiths and to anyone else in the 
subdivision was one of ensuring the road, curb, gutter and utilities were properly 
installed and met Utah County and Lehi City ordinance requirements. Because Mary 
Mel did not work on the Smiths' property itself, it owed no duty to the Smiths regarding 
the soil its compaction, or the development of the property. 
The Smiths' continue to maintain that Mary Mel was the entity which put fill in 
the ravine or at a minimum should have known that fill was being placed in the ravine on 
the Smiths' property. However, the Smiths could offer the district court no evidence to 
substantiate that claim. Instead of evidence, the Smiths offer only the following 
statement in support of their contention that Mary Mel either filled the ravine or knew 
about fill being placed in the ravine: "Finally, circumstantial evidence imputes 
knowledge to Mary Mel from its grading the road in question and filling in the nearby 
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ravine with excess grading fill which later became the Smiths' lot/' R. 695, The Smiths 
go on to allege that "'Messrs. Prettyman, Merrill, Stuart, Sharp, Chestnut and Edgar all 
provide credible testimony and evidence, which taken together, leads to the clear 
inference that Mary Mel knew or should have known of its improper grading and filling 
of the Smiths* lot." R. 693. Simply put, the Smiths* case comes down to argument that 
the fill was in the ravine and therefore, there is somehow an inference this fill was placed 
in the ravine by Mary Mel or else Mary Mel knew about the fill. However this inference 
amounts to nothing but speculation. "Such speculation is insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact for purposes of a summary judgment motion." Glover v. Boy 
Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Utah 1996); see also Harline v. Barker, 912 
P.2d 433. 435 (Utah 1996) (holding summary judgment appropriate when proximate 
cause of injury is left to speculation). 
In this case, the Smiths can present no material facts beyond speculation which 
support the proposition that Mary Mel had a duty to the Smiths to take some action 
regarding the allegedly uncompacted fill. If there is no duty there is no breach of duty 
and Mary Mel is not liable under a theory of negligence. Therefore, for the reasons 
stated above this Court should affirm the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Mary Mel on the Smiths' claim for negligence. 
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V. THE SMITH'S CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION IS BARRED BY THE ECONOMIC LOSS 
RULE. 
Even if this Court determines that the Smith's have made a prima facie showing of 
all elements of the torts of negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and 
negligence, it should still affirm the judgment of the district court under the economic 
loss rule. It is a well known rule of procedure that an appellate court can affirm on any 
appropriate ground, even if it was not raised at the district court. Straub v. Fisher and 
Paykel Health Care. 990 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1999). In this case, the Smiths* claims are 
barred by the economic loss rule. 
In general the economic loss rule is defined as: 
""damages for inadequate value costs or repair and replacement of the 
defective product or consequential loss of profits-without any claim of 
personal injury or damage to other property . . . as well as "'the diminution 
in value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work 
for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold/"'" 
SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback and Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 
54. r 32. 28 P.3d 669 {citations omitted). As this court has stated on several occasions, 
"the rationales underlying the doctrine are particularly applicable in the construction 
setting/* Id. at^|35. 
"Construction projects are characterized by detailed and comprehensive 
contracts that form the foundation of the industry's operations. Contracting 
parties are free to adjust their respective obligations to satisfy their mutual 
expectations. For example, a developer can contract for low grade 
materials that meet only minimum requirements of the building code. 
When the developer sells those units, a buyer should not be able to turn 
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around and sue the builder for the poor quality of the construction. 
Presumably the buyer received what he paid for or he con bring a contract 
claim against his seller. Meanwhile, if the developer has a problem with 
the builder, he too will have a contract remedy. A buyer can avoid 
economic loss resulting from defective construction by obtaining a 
thorough inspection of the property prior to purchase and then by either 
obtaining insurance or by negotiating a warranty or reduction in price to 
reflect the risk of hidden defects/" 
Id. {quoting American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMech. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182. 
1190 (Utah 1996). Thus, "relief for defeated economic expectations under a design or 
construction contract [is] to come from the contract itself, not from third parties. . . . [T]o 
conclude otherwise would essentially impose the plaintiffs" "economic expectations upon 
parties whom the plaintiffs did not know and with whom they did not deal and upon 
contracts to which they were not a party.""" Id. (citations omitted). Man* Mel can discern 
no reason why the economic loss rule would be inapplicable to the facts of this case and 
bar each of their causes of action. 
In SME Industries, this Court recently discussed the applicability of the economic 
loss rule to negligent misrepresentation claims and in so doing cast serious doubt as to 
the validity of cases relied upon by the Smith's such as Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986). Specifically, the SME Industries 
court was confronted with a negligent misrepresentation claim made against an architect. 
After acknowledging the existence of Price-Orem and other similar cases, the court went 
on to examine cases from other jurisdictions which specifically applied the economic loss 
rule to the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Id. at <[j 42-43. In so doing this court 
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determined that the reasoning of the courts applying the economic loss rule to 
negligent misrepresentation claims in the construction industry was "persuasive."' The 
SME Industries court noted "were we to recognize a cause of action under section 552 
[of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Negligent Misrepresentation)], however, parties 
could essentially sidestep contractual duties by bringing a cause of action in tort to 
reco\ er the vers' benefits they were unable to obtain in contractual negotiations. Id. at % 
44. Accordingly, the Court concluded "to maintain the fundamental boundary between 
tort and contract law, we hold that when parties have contract, as in the construction 
industry, to protect against economic liability, contract principles override the tort 
principles enunciated in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and. thus, 
economic losses are not recoverable/' Id. 
Under SME Industries, the Smiths have no cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation. There are three separate contractual transactions under the 
microscope in this case: (1) the contract in which Mary Mel sold its interest in the 
property to Patterson Construction; (2) the contract in which Patterson Construction sold 
its interest to GT Investments and (2) the contract in which GT Investments sold its 
interest in lot 223 to the Smiths. As in SME Industries and the cases upon which it relies, 
these contracts were made at arms length between parties that could negotiate any and all 
risks between them. The Smiths had the right to contract with the GT Investments over 
whether any compaction tests should have been done or which party would carry the 
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risks if any problems should arise, i.e., by contracting to purchase a piece of property as 
is rather than accompanied by numerous warranties and pledges, a party presumably pays 
less. GT Investments had this same right with Patterson Construction, which in turn had 
the same right with Mary Mel. These are the contracts that form the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties and tort principles should not be allowed to override those 
contracts. 
Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals has decided a case with facts very-
similar to those in this case. In Carlson v. Sharp, 994 P.2d 851 (Wash Ct. App. 2000), 
homeowners brought a lawsuit against a developer and a geotechnical engineering firm 
hired by the developer. After the developer had placed fill in the lot. the engineering 
firm produced a report indicating that the lots were suitable for manufactured homes. 
Eventually homes were built on the lots, at which point they began to sink and settle 
causing damage to the homes. The homeowners sued both the developer and the 
engineer under a theory of negligence in that the developer inadequately compacted the 
land and the engineer was negligent in performing its study of the land. The trial court 
concluded that the engineer was negligent.15 Id. at 852-53. 
However, on appeal the engineering firm argued that the homeowners claims were 
barred by the economic loss rule. The Washington Court agreed. After discussing much 
of the background of the economic loss rule the court concluded: 
5
 The developer filed bankruptcy before trial and its liability was not discussed. 
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Strata [the engineering firm] entered a contract with Mr. Sharp [the 
developer] and provided a report to him. Even if that report was 
negligently written or the analysis negligently performed, the allocation of 
risk lies in the contract between those two parties. 
Id. at 854. Accordingly, the court determined that the economic loss rule applied and 
that the homeowners' claims were not recoverable in tort. Id. 
This case offers no material differences with Carlson. As in Carlson, the Smiths' 
home settled as a result of allegedly improperly compacted fill material. As in Carlson, 
the Smiths' are claiming solely economic damages, i.e., damages to the house due to 
settling. Further, as in Carlson, the homeowners do not have a contract with a party they 
are attempting to hold liable under tort principles. As there are no material differences in 
the facts of this case and the facts of Carlson, and because Carlson is consistent with this 
court's prior decisions, this Court should adopt the reasoning of Carlson and affirm the 
judgment of the district court on the basis of the economic loss rule. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above this Court should affirm the judgment of the district 
court and dismiss the Smiths' claims on appeal. 
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